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CULTURE AND TIME: A STUDY ON THE
DETERMINANTS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

DANIEL

M.

BUTLER

Thcrr is a growing literature about the relationship between democracy and human rights.
This article extends thlt researeh b)1 specifically examining the relationship between democracy
,lIld religious tolerance. III this article, J also improl'e upon existing literature by using an OIS
regression on a cro.u-section of70 countries to identifjl a new important relationship between
regime dumbility (i.e. how long a regime has remained in power) and the level of religious
tolerance. Ifind that, in democmcies, regime length does not determine the level ofrepression,
but, in non-democracies, regime length does affect the level of religious tolerance. J find that
after holding the level of democracy/autocracy constant, authoritarian regimes become more
repre.Hil'e the longer thC)' surl'il'e.

W

ith the recent regime change in Afghanistan and the current situation in Iraq, many have wondered about the prospects for
democracy in Islamic countries. Can the Islamic culture support
democracy? The discussion of the chances for Islamic democracy is reminiscent
of debates about the prospect of democracy in Asia (Kim 1994; Culture is Destiny 1994). My purpose in this paper is not to determine the likelihood of
democracy under various religious traditions; instead, I will take the debate one
step further by exploring what form democracy will take under differing religious
circumstances. To examine that question, I will proceed on the premise that
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democracy is possible in any culture. Certainly Japan, South Korea, and other
Asian countries have developed strong democracies, and even among Islamic
countries there is evidence that democracy can survive. Mali is an Islamic
country that enjoys a consolidated democracy, and other countries such as
Turkey and Jordan have become more democratic. While these examples
certainly do not provide firm evidence that Islamic countries can support
long-term democracy, they do justifY making the assumption that democracy
is possible.
This assumption allows us to ask the more intriguing questions:-what form
will democracy take under different cultures? Is democracy so uniform that in
every culture it has the same characteristics? Or does the qualiry of democracy
depend upon a country's political culture?
In the present study, I measure the quality of democracy by measuring a
country's level of religious freedom. When I examine the relationship between
a country's dominant religious culture (a measure of political culture) and its
level of religious freedom, I find that religious culture does determine the level
of freedom. A country's religious tradition does affect the qualiry of its democracy. This finding has important implications for policy makers. It shows that
democracy does not necessarily come in a one-size fits all package.
In this study, I consider another understudied relationship: the effect of
regime durability (the length a regime has survived) on the level of freedom (in
this case religious freedom) in that country. I find that, after controlling for the
level of democracy, regime durability has no impact on religious freedom in
democracies, but it has a negative impact in non-democracies. In other words,
holding the level of democracy/autocracy constant, authoritarian regimes will
become more repressive of religious freedom the longer they survive, while
democratic regimes do not change over time.
Some reading this paper will wonder why I have chosen to discuss these
two relationships together when each deserves its own separate consideration.
While these two considerations are clearly different topics, they are both u-ying to determine what affects the same phenomenon: the level of religious freedom. Does religious tradition affect a country's level of religious freedom?
What about regime length? Or is it a combination of both? Examining these
relationships together allows us to control for the effects of the other causal
factor.
Why Study Religious Tradition/Culture as a Crucial Causal Factor?
As I stated above, there is an ongoing debate about the relationship between
culture and democracy. The difficulry in measuring political culture makes testing the relationship between political culture and democracy difficult. The
advantage of using a country's dominant religion as a measure of its culture is
that religion is a measure that is valid, parsimonious, and easy to collect.
The measure is valid because a country's dominant religion reflects its population's major values (i.e. its culture). It is parsimonious because it captures so

38

SIGMA

BUTLER

many aspects of culture at the same time. In reality, political culture includes a
variety of attitudes and motivations. When trying to capture all of these aspects
separately, the explanation gets laborious. Looking at religion simplifies the
situation without losing descriptive accuracy by capturing many of these
concepts in a single measure. Finally, it is a useful measure because identifying
a country's dominant religion is relatively easy to do.
Certainly others have used religion as an important explanatory variable.
The hypothesis that democratic performance is associated with the prevailing
religious order in a society has played a major role in democratic theory (Eckstein et al. 1998, 365). Starting with studies on the effect of the Protestant work
ethic, religion has been recognized as playing a role in shaping a nation's political
culture. While religion is recognized as an important causal factor, Eckstein
states that not enough research has been done to examine its relationships to
democracy (1998, 365). This study uses this important (but often overlooked)
factor to study the level of religious freedom that exists in a given country.
Why Study Regime Type and Durability?
Poe and Tate (1994) found that the level of government repression
decreased with increasing levels of democracy. Since then many authors have
confirmed those findings in their own research on related topics (Keith 1999;
Blanton 2000). I also find that decreased levels of repression of religious freedom are associated with increasing levels of democracy.
One causal factor that these authors have not considered is the relationship
between repression and regime durability (the length the regime survives).
When a regime is first established, its weak bureaucracy may limit its ability to
act. As a result, even if the government has popular support, it may not be able
to implement and enforce policies. As time goes by, the regime will develop a
better and more effective bureaucratic infrastructure and will accordingly
become more or less oppressive.
There are reasons to believe that various regime types use their increased
bureaucratic strength differently. In authoritarian states, organized religion,
unless it is state sponsored and controlled, is most typically a threat to the
regime. First. it raises citizens' expectations. Having enjoyed religious freedom,
citizens want more freedom in other areas. Second, religion competes with the
state for citiz.ens' loyalty. To survive, authoritarian governments must command
complete loyalty of the people. Third, organized religion provides a mechanism
and vehicle for organized resistance. For example the local Catholic clergy
played an important role in the downfall of many of the authoritarian regimes
in Latin America.
Organized religion clearly poses a threat to the authoritarian regime. However, a newly established authoritarian regime may not be secure enough to
repress religion and religious freedom. However, as time goes by and governments
develop stronger bureaucracies, they will employ that strength to repress
threatening opposition, in this case, organized religion.
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In democracies, governments typically do not use their bureaucracies as
tools for systematic religious repression because organized religion plays a constructive role; religion is an important aspect of civil society that strengthens the
state. Alexis de Tocqueville commented on the place of religion in democracies
and authoritarian regimes. He argued, "despotism may govern without faith,
but liberty cannot. Religion .. .is more needed in democratic republics than in
any other" (qtd. in Kessler 1997, 123). The point is not that democratic governments use their bureaucratic strength to promote religious freedom, but
rather that they have no reason to use their bureaucratic arm to repress religious
freedom. Thus, when controlling for the level of democracy, a regime's durability has no effect on the level of religious freedom in democracies. In summary,
in authoritarian states we would expect regime durability to lead to decreased
levels of religious freedom, but in democratic states there should be no relationship between regime durability and the level of religious freedom.
Why Study Religious Freedom?
In reference to his own career, A.M. Rosenthal, the former executive of the
New York Times, said:
Early this year I realized that in decades of reporting, writing, or assigning
stories on human rights, I rarely touched on one of the most important.
Political human rights, legal, civil, and press rights, emphatically often; but
the right to worship where and how God or conscience leads, almost never.
(qtd. Marshall 2000. 9)
One reason to study the determinants of religious tolerance is simply
because this topic has not received adequate attention. While there is a growing
body of literature on the determinants of human rights (see for example Poe
and Tate, 1994; Booth and Richard 1996; Davenport 1999), researchers have
ignored the determinants of religious freedom.
More particularly, using religious freedom as the dependent variable has
two important benefits in this case. First, one purpose of this study is to see if
authoritarian regimes are more likely to use their repressive arm to consolidate.
For the reasons I articulated above, an authoritarian regime is likely to be particularly aggressive against organized religious groups. Using the level of religious
freedom allows us to determine if authoritarian regimes are more repressive of
religion the longer they have survived.
Second, religious freedom is a good measure of what I have referred to as
the "quality" of a regime type; it indicates what freedoms are enjoyed under a
given government. One goal of this research is to determine if democracy
manifests itself differently depending on the religious culture. Since I am using
democracy as one of the control variables, it is important to measure the quality of democracy in a way that is not already captured in the definition of
democracy but at the same time gives some indication of the manifestation of
the quality of democracy. This approach is admittedly problematic and its
validity depends upon how one defines democracy. While I do not know of any
definition that explicitly incorporates religious freedom into its definition, there
40
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are others that incorporate the concepts of freedom of thought and belief. In
the present study, I use the Polity IV measure of democracy, which focuses on
political competition and executive constraints. I also verifY my results using
Freedom House scores.

Defining Religious Freedom
Unfortunately, a uniform measurement for the level of religious freedom
across all states does not exist. One potential source for these rankings is the
U.S. State Department's annual Internation,zi Religious Freedom Report. The
State Department identifies five levels of religious intoleration (U.S. Department of State Executive Report 2001). It also lists some of the nations that are
the worst offenders in each category. Unfortunately, it only lists 25 countries.
Further, it only lists the worst offenders. The sample does not include any
nations that are religiously tolerant, limiting the variation in the sample and
introducing potential bias.
Outside of the State Department's annual report, the best and most
comprehensive measurement comes from the Center for Religious Freedom: A
Division of Freedom House. As part of a recent report, the Center for Religious
freedom assigned a score between 1 and 7 to a list of 75 countries that represent all the major religions and regions in the world. A score of 1.0 to 3.0 indicates that a nation is free, a score of 3.5 to 5.0 indicates that a nation is partly
free, and a score of 5.5 to 7.0 indicates that a nation is not free. As with Freedom House's annual survey, the religious freedom scores are based on consistent
survey criteria. The survey criteria employed were based on four sources: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, the European Convention on Human Rights, and
from a list of criteria developed by Willy Fautre (Marshall 2000, 334-335)
The criteria used do not measure all forms of religious persecution, but
rather only violations that are specifically directed against (at least in a major
way) an individual's or group's religion. The report explains:
By religious freedom or persecution, I do not mean human rights violations against "religious" persons. After all, since most people in the world
claim some sort of religious identity, then most human rights violations of
any kind are presumably against religious believers. Rather, we are concerned /lot with all forms of persecution of religious people but with persecution where the focus or the grounds are themselves religious-where a
person's religion is a component of the persecution or discrimination they
suffer. Hence, we do not cover situations such as, for example, Rwanda
where, even though most of those who were killed (and who killed) were
relatively religious, the genocide was itself ethnically based. (Marshall
2000,9)
Finally it is important to note that the report points out that the religious
tolerance measurements do not necessarily reflect a nation's governmental policy,
but "the situation in countries .... In some cases, such as in civil war, there may
be little religious freedom, but a government may be able to do little about it."
SIGMA
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While this point is well taken, I believe that generally a government may do a
lot about it. The exception of civil war is well noted, but it is just that - an
exception. In general, religious freedom means that a government not only
provides laws of religious freedom, but actively strives to enforce them. Such
government actions go a long way in protecting religious minorities. For the
purpose of this study, I consider governments that do not enforce laws protecting religious freedom to be compromising religious freedom.
In order to verifY that the Freedom House measure captures the level of
religious freedom, I tested the correlation between the U.S. State Department's
ranking and the Freedom House scores, since the State Department scores
explicitly measure the level of religious freedom laws. The high correlation
between these variables justifies the use of the Freedom House measures to capture the level of religious freedom.
To facilitate interpretation, I kept the scale ranging from 1 to 7, but I
inverted the scale. Therefore a score of 7 indicates that a country is free, while
a score of 1 indicates that it is not free. In the results, a positive coefficient
signifies an improvement in religious freedom.
Modeling the Level of Religious Freedom
Having identified the dependent variable and its operational definition, I
will now focus on the independent variables that I include in the analysis. I
chose most of the control variables based on the work of Poe and Tate (1994).
It was natural to follow Poe and Tate because they also examine the determinants of one aspect of human rights.
Democracy
As I explained above, Poe and Tate found a strong relationship between
democracy and the level of human rights repression. I include it here as a
control variable. Measuring democracy is very difficult and there is widespread
disagreement on how it should be defined. For the reasons I stated above, I
choose to use measures from the Polity IV data set (Polity IV project 2000). In
that data set, 161 countries are rated on the autocratic and democratic aspects
of their regimes. Both measures are given on an II-point scale (0-10). An
increasing democracy rating indicated greater general political openness. In
contrast, an increasing autocracy score indicates greater political closedness.
Both ratings are based upon each nation's ratings in nine different areas that
focus on political competition and executive constraints. In my analysis I used
the combined scores of these two ratings, a measure I refer to as democratic
strength. Democratic strength is calculated by subtracting each nation's autocracy
rating from its democracy rating. Measured on a scale from -10 to 10, an
increasing score of democratic strength effectively captures the move away from
authoritarianism and towards democratic consolidation.
To verifY my results, I used Freedom House's democracy ratings to run a
regression of the same model. The Freedom House ratings are based on each
country's performance in granting electoral rights and civil liberties to its citi-
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zens. Each of these scores is given on an ascending scale of 1 to 7 where one is
the highest score. I calculated the democracy rating by adding the two scores
together and dividing by two. I then inverted the scale so that it ranged from
1 (being the least democratic) to 7 (being the most democratic). Using a
different measure of democracy did affect some of my results. In the discussion
of the regression results that follows, I offer some potential reasons for those
observed differences.

Population
The rationale for including population size is that as nation becomes
larger, its leaders use more repressive means to keep control (Poe and Tate 1994,
857). Further, other researchers have noted the high incidence of democratic
consolidation among small nations (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Diamond 1999,
117 -160). It may be that smaller nations are less likely to use oppressive means.
I used the United State's Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook 2000 to
find the population of each nation.
GNP
Poe and Tate's rationale for testing the effects of economic factors on democratic strength is that increasing development relieves repression (1994, 857-858).
The expectation is that as the wealth of a country increases so does its middle
class. The middle class has more time and resources to devote to politics. In both
pseudo-democracies and non-democracies, the middle class pushes for political
reforms that will benefit it politically and economically. I measured economic
strength of a country by using its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in the
year 2000. I took this information from the World Bank group (2002).

Religious Dummy Variables
The first key independent variable comes from the study by the Center for
Religious Freedom. It placed nations into nine categories: Catholic, Protestant,
Orthodox, Mixed Christian, Mixed Muslim and Christian, Islam, Jewish,
Hindu, and Buddhism and related religions. In the following sections, I include
a table that catalogues in which group each nation was placed.
As I stated in the introductory part of the paper, religion should capture the
essence of a nation's culture. However, it is also possible that geography affects a
nation's culture more than religious persuasion. Nations that are near to each
other are likely to have increased trade and intertwined histories. To test that
theory, I raon a regression that included dummy variables for both religious
persuasion and geographic location. While geography proved insignificant,
almost all of the religious identification variables were quite significant. Therefore, in the analysis presented here, I only include the variables for religious persuasion.
Regime Durability
The other key independent variable is regime durability by regime type. To
create the variables necessary to capture this variable, I first used the democratic
strength rating to place each nation into one of three categories: non-democratic,
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quasi-democratic, and democratic. I labeled each nation with a democratic
strength score less than -5 as non-democratic; I labeled nations with a democratic strength score between -5 and 5 as quasi-democratic; and I labeled each
nation with a democratic strength score greater than 5 as democratic. Using
these designations, 45 nations were labeled as democracies, 11 as quasidemocracies, and 14 as non-democracies.
After creating dummy variables for each of these three categories, I interacted these dummy variables with the durability variable from the Polity IV
data set. The durability measure simply measures how long the current regime
has been in power. The durability scores start at the year 1900, so any regime
that has lasted more than 100 years still only gets a score of 100. This is not a
concern because only a few of the regimes have even lasted that long (the
United Kingdom, the United States). The democratic durability, quasidemocratic durability, and non-democratic durability variables capture the
effect of time passage on the level of religious toleration in each type of regime.
As I said above, I also used Freedom House's measure of democracy as a
check on my results. In the regression that included the Freedom House ratings,
I divided the nations by regime types using Freedom House's three categories:
free, partly free, and not free. I label these three categories as democratic, quasidemocratic, and non-democratic respectively. I again created dummy variables
for these values and then interacted them with the durability score, giving me
a measure of the effects over time for each regime.
Description of Sample
The data set includes 71 of the 76 countries rated in Marshall's book.
excluded five cases because of insufficient data in the other sources from which
I gathered information. Those nations did not include information for various
reasons. Tibet could not be included because it is under the rule of China and
is not a sovereign nation. Lebanon, East Timor, Mauritania, and Eritrea were
excluded because the Polity IV data set did not give these countries democratic
and autocratic ratings for the year 2000.
Using only half of the countries in the world introduces the possibility of
bias. It should be noted that when choosing which nations to include in the
sample, the Center for Religious Freedom focused on large countries. They
point out that the sample of countries includes over 90 percent of the world
population (Marshall 2000, vii). If there is a trend among small countries that
is different from large ones, this sample will produce biased results. Yet as the
tables below show, this group of nations includes nations from all the regions
and religious persuasions of the world. Because the sample is representative of
the world at large, I feel justified in extending my conclusions to all nations.
Countries by GeogralJhic Region
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
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North Afi'ica and West Asia: Egypt, Greece, Israel, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey
Western Eztrope and North Ati,mtic: Ausrria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States
Asia: Bangladesh, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Nepal, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Vietnam
Afi'ica: Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico
Countries by Major Religious Persuasion
Catholic: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Mexico, Philippines,
Poland, Spain
Protestant: Botswana, Estonia, Finland, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe
Orthodox: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova,
Romania, Russia, Ukraine
Mixed Christian: Germany, Latvia
Hindu: India, Nepal
Buddhism and related religions: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Sri
Lanka, Singapore, Bhutan, China, Vietnam, Burma, North Korea
Islam: Azerb-aijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
Jewish: Israel
~1ixed Muslim/Christian:

Nigeria
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Table 1: ~mocracy"s effect on Religious tolerance
I
Variable
Intercept
5.05**
(0.35)
Democratic Strength
(Polity IV)

0.098***
(0.028)

Democratic Durability
(Polity IV)

0.0088
(0.014)

Pseudo-democratic Durability
(Polity IV)

-0.0053
(0.020)

Non-democratic Durability
(Polity IV)

-0.017*
(0.0093)

2

2.77***
(0.51)

Democracy
(Freedom House)

0.54***
(0.085)

Free (FH) Durability

0.012
(.011)

Partly Free (FH) Durability

0.00053
(0.016)

Not Free (PH) Durability

-0.010
(0.0074)

GNI per capita in 2000
(reported in $1000)

0.028**
(0.013)

.0087
(.0 L!)

Population
(in 1,000,000)

-0.43
(0.61 )

-0.26
(0.51)

Catholic

-0.99***
(0.33)

-0.90*'"*
(0.28)

Orthodox

-1.57 ***
(0.40)

-1.11 ***
(0.35)

Hindu

-2.61 ***
(0.75)

-2.41 ***
(0.63)

Buddhism

-1.28***
(0.74)

-0.%**
(0.37)

Islam

-2.14***
(0.41 )

-1.58*'1001'

Jewish

-1.50
(0.89)

-1.16
(0.75)

Mixed Christian

-1.70**
(0.92)

-1.49*
(0.76)

Mixed Muslim/Christian

-2.40***
(0.92)
70

-1.91 *".
(0.78)
70

N

Adj. R-Square

.7481

Standard Errors are given in parentheses
"'Significant at.1O "''''Significant at .05
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Discussion of Results
Although Poe and Tate found population to be a significant predictor of
human rights, it appears insignificant in both of the regressions I performed.
This does not necessarily indicate that population is an insignificant predictor
of religious freedom; more likely, it indicates something about the nature of the
sample. The focus of the Freedom House survey was large nations. By limiting
the sample to the largest nations, the variation is limited. If a full sample of
nations was included, this measure may well appear to be significant.
The differences between the results of the two regressions, which are found
in Table 1, can be attributed to the different democracy measures. The Polity
IV data focuses on political competition and executive constraints. In contrast,
the Freedom House measure accounts for the level of political and civil liberties.
Because civil liberties encompass the idea of religious freedom to some extent,
the measure for democracy in the second model may be artificially high. The
potentially high correlation between these variables may be soaking up all of the
variation, explaining why GN! per capita and non-democratic durability drop
out as insignificant.
In contrast to the variables that drop out as insignificant, the religious
identification variables remain significant and substantial in both regressions.
This indicates the strength of this relationship. The values on the religious persuasion variables indicate that all things being equal, Protestant countries enjoy
the most religious freedom. The large values for the coefficients added to the
fact that each of the variables proved to be significant indicates the strength of
this relationship. Since I controlled for the degree of democratic strength in
each nation, the coefficients indicate how nations of different religious persuasions compare when democracy/autocracy is at the same level in each. For
example, a Protestant nation that receives the highest democratic strength score
of 10 is expected to rate 1 point higher (on a scale of7) on its level of religious
freedom than a Catholic nation with a democracy score of 10. The fact that all
the religion coefficients are negative indicates that, relative to Protestant
nations, the level of religious freedom is lower in all non-Protestant countries.
The strong relationship between a nation's major religious persuasion(s)
and its level of religious freedom suggests that the former affects the quality of
the nation's democracy. Religious political culture does not preclude the establishment of democracy, but a nation's major religious persuasion(s) affects the
way that democracy looks.
While the results of the regression analysis provide strong evidence for the
effect of religious persuasion on the level of religious freedom, they give a mixed
story about the importance of regime length. In the first regression, the results
came out as we expected: non-democratic durability was the only durability
variable that proved significant. Admittedly, it was only significant at the .10
level, but in a sample of only 71 observations, even this finding is not completely insignificant.
SIGMA

47

CULTURE AND TIME

The fact that the relationship drops out as insignificant in the second
regression indicates the weakness of the relationship. However, it does not mean
there is no relationship. As I indicated above, the change in the second regression is most likely due to the fact that the Freedom House democracy score
takes civil liberties into account. While the results of the second regression do
not completely ruin my results, it does indicate that the relationship between
regime durability and religious freedom is weak.
These scores indicate that, in states with democratic and quasi-democratic
regimes, the level of overall democracy determines the level of religious freedom. The length of a democratic regime's existence does not affect the quality
of democracy. If during that period a country improves its quality of democracy,
religious freedom will improve, but passage of time alone has no effect. It only
has an effect inasmuch as it affects the consolidation of democracy.
In contrast, the coefficient on the non-democratic durability indicates that,
in an authoritarian state, the longer a regime endures the more repressive it
becomes of religious freedom. The inclusion of the democratic strength variable
precludes the possibility that this is simply a result of the level of a regime's
autocratic characteristics.
To illustrate the effect of regime length on the level of religious freedom,
we can theoretically compare several countries. In democracies, it is the level of
democratic strength that is important in determining the level of religious freedom. If two countries receive a score of a level 8 for their democratic strength
rating, but one has been around for two years and the other around for twenty
years, they will have the same religious freedom score. Of course, this typically
does not happen because democracies that have been around for only two years
typically do not have democracy ratings as high as those that have been around
for twenty years. But, when the democratic strength of a country is controlled
for, regime durability has no significant effect on the level of religious freedom
in democracies. The same is true of quasi-democracies.
In contrast, if two non-democracies each receive a -8 for their democratic
strength rating, but one has been around for two years and the other for twenty
years, the citizens under the regime that has been around for twenty years will
enjoy less religious freedom. Therefore the length that a non-democratic regime
is in power is related to its level of repression of religious freedom.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that the major religious persuasion of a nation,
a measure of its political culture, is a significant predictor of its level of religious
freedom. In fact, it proved to be more robust than the economic factor I
included, GNl. Religious persuasion needs to be considered more often as an
explanatory variable.
The strength of the religious persuasion variables also indicates that when
all other things are equal, the religious persuasion of the nation will affect the
level of religious freedom. This suggests that the democracy we see in America
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is not the exact same type of democracy we will see in other countries. I am not
making a normative argument that it should or should not be that way, or even
that it will always be that way; rather, I am suggesting that it is that way right
now. Democracy does not look exactly the same in every nation.
The second finding about regime length is inconclusive. Certainly the relationship is weak at best. Yet the fact that the relationship appears, even as only
a weak one, in the first regression, suggests that this is a topic worth more
exploration. The evidence suggests that authoritarian regimes might become
more repressive with time. It is possible, as I have suggested, that authoritarian
regimes get more restrictive of religious freedom with time in order to consolidate power. Future researchers should examine the strength of this relationship
and explore the reason behind it.

Mtlrl'ied to Debomh Lynn Shepherd. DanieL Butler is a senior at BYU majoring in politiml science. Of Richard j. and Diane Butler's five sons. he is the fourth
in number and the shortest in height. Despite that disadvantage, he enjoys playing
basketball as well as other sports. He currently works as a Political Science 200 T.A.
and as one ofDI: Sven Wilson's Research Assistants. In the fall he wiLl begin a Ph.D.
pl'ogmm in political science.
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